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1. INTRODUCTION 
When a group is to rank order n alternatives, it is common for them to 
adopt some sort of weighted voting system. Namely, n numbers 
w(l), W), * . ., w(n) are selected. Next, each individual of the group assigns 
to each alternative one of these numbers. The number of points cast for 
each alternative is then totaled. The n alternatives are ordered according to 
their total point values, where the group ordinal ranking of the n altema- 
tives is given either by this ordering or by the reversal of this ranking. For 
example, for a plurality vote the weights are w(1) = 1 while w(i) = 0; and 
the more votes an alternative receives, the higher is its group ranking. There 
are voting systems, notably in some athletic events, where lower values are 
assigned to higher-ranked choices, and the smaller the total assigned to an 
alternative the higher is its group ranking. For example, consider a track 
meet where the teams are to be ranked. Each “team” becomes an “altema- 
tive”, and an “event” is a “voter”. The way a “voter” marks the ballot 
corresponds to how the competitors from the different eams placed in the 
event. 
Perhaps most people instinctively realize that the choice of the weights 
can alter the outcome of the election, For example, for four alternatives, 
should one advocate the use of the weights 5,3,2,1 or the weights 4,3,2,1; 
how will the choice affect he outcome? (Several years ago several countries 
employed ifferent weighting systems to determine which country was the 
“real” victor of the Olympics. As one might expect, the “conclusions” 
depended upon the choice of the adopted system.) On the other hand, 
unless there is a drastic difference between two weighted voting systems, it
would seem reasonable to expect only slight differences between the two 
resulting rankings. This need not be the case. In a recent paper [2], P. 
Fishbum established the following surprising result. Suppose for n > 2 
alternatives there are two different monotone-weighted voting systems. (This 
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is a system where larger values of weights are assigned to more favored 
choices.) Then for any ranking of the alternatives, there exist examples of 
voters’ preferences with the following property: If the voters use the first 
weighted system then the outcome will be the given ranking of the altema- 
tives; should they use the second weighted system, the group outcome is the 
exact reverse! For example, if the four alternatives are a, b, c, and d; then 
there exist examples of voters where if they vote with the first system given 
above then the outcome is a > b > c > d. On the other hand, if the same 
voters use the second system the outcome is d > c > b > a. (The inequality 
between alternatives, such as d > c, implies that d is preferred to c.) 
In this paper we show that the situation can be much worse than implied 
by the Fishbum article. We do this by extending Fishbum’s result in the 
following three ways: 
(1) The weighted voting systems need not be monotone for the same 
conclusions to hold. 
(2) The specified outcomes need not be reversals of each other; they 
could be much worse-they can be arbitrary! More specifically, let A(1) 
and A(2) correspond to any two rankings of the n > 2 alternatives. Then 
for any two different-weighted voting systems there exist examples of voters’ 
preferences o that when they use the first system the outcome is A(l), yet if 
the same voters use the second system then the outcome is A(2)! Ranking 
A(1) need not be the reversal of A(2). 
(3) The result holds for more than two voting systems. Suppose we are 
given j completely different weighted voting systems (the definition for 
“completely different” will be given later). Let A(l), . . . , A(j) correspond to 
any j rankings of the n alternatives. Then, there exist examples of voters’ 
preferences o that if the same voters use the i th weighted voting system, the 
outcome will be A(i), i = 1, . . . , j. 
These results are similar in flavor to a result we obtained earlier (Saari [3]) 
concerning n > 2 alternatives and weighted voting systems. In that paper it 
was shown that the outcome from voting need not correspond to a linear 
ordering. To do this, we start with any ranking A of the n alternatives. 
Next, some one alternative is removed and the (n - 1) remaining altema- 
tives are reranked into any ranking B. For any weighted voting system on 
the n alternatives and for any weighted voting system on the (n - 1) 
alternatives, it turns out that there exist examples of voters such that when 
they vote on the n alternatives the outcome is A, yet when they use the 
second system to rank the (n - 1) alternatives the outcome is B. Note, 
ranking A and ranking B need not have any relationship whatsoever to 
each other. In particular, ranking B need not be a restriction of A as it 
would be if A were a true linear ordering of the group’s preferences. 
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In this current paper, this result will be generalized even further. Start 
with n > 2 alternatives. In (n - 2) steps successively discard an alternative. 
Let A(j) be an arbitrary ranking of the j alternatives which remain in the 
(n - j)th step, j = 2,. . . , n. For each j, select a weighted voting system to 
rank the j alternatives. Our new result asserts that there exist examples of 
voters such that when they are to rank the set of j alternatives using the 
designated voting system, the outcome is A(j)! Again, as in the original 
result, these rankings need not have any relationship with one another. No 
restrictions are imposed upon the weighted voting systems. In particular, the 
voting system adopted for smaller number of alternatives could be the same 
one, or what is proposed as being a natural “projection” of the voting 
system used for a larger number of alternatives. The conclusion asserting 
that the resulting group outcomes may have no relationship between each 
other still holds. This means that this type of paradox cannot be explained 
away by arguing that an “incorrect” restriction or projection of a voting 
system was used on the smaller set of alternatives. In other words, this result 
implies that such a “projection” does not exist. 
Finally, we combine both theorems to obtain a theorem which implies 
that the ultimate of chaos can result from weighted voting systems. Start 
with sets of 2,3,. . . , n alternatives which are selected in the fashion given 
above. On the set of j alternatives, select (j - 1) “completely different” 
weighted voting systems. On the set of j alternatives, let A(i, j), i = 1,. . . , 
j- 1; j=2,3,..., n, be a ranking of the set of j alternatives- there is no 
restriction on the choice of these rankings. The theorem asserts that there 
exists examples of voters such that for any choice of i and j, when the same 
voters rank the set of j alternatives using the i th weighted voting system, 
the resulting ranking is A(i, j). In the choice of the weighted voting 
systems, we impose a condition that the (j - 1) systems elected to rank j 
alternatives are “completely different” (see Definition 2), but no conditions 
are imposed between a pair of voting systems selected to rank j and k 
alternatives. 
As one might expect, there is an extensive literature concerned with the 
theme of weighted voting systems. Some of these references are given in 
my earlier paper [3], but perhaps a more authoritative source would be 
Fishbum’s paper, where he cites and discusses the appropriate articles 
which predate his result and which contribute to this development. 
The approach used here and in our earlier paper appears to be new in the 
social choice literature. The difficult combinatorics associated with proving 
this type of result are avoided by posing the problem in a geometric setting. 
The result then follows from the geometric properties of Euclidean spaces 
and the properties of open mappings between them. Furthermore, in the 
social choice literature examples disproving “what should be” are often 
constructed by use of the Condorcet triplets. These are three rankings of 
three alternatives which are arranged in a cyclic order such as a > b > c; 
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b > c > a; and c > a > b. There is a natural generalization of these rank- 
ings to what we call “Condorcet n-tuples”; it turns out that their properties 
play a role in our approach. In fact, one of the goals of this paper is to 
outline what are the geometric properties associated with these n-tuples 
which permit them to be the building blocks for “counterexamples.” This 
discussion is at the end of Section 5, where we briefly consider the effects on 
these paradoxes which result from imposing a restriction on voters’ prefer- 
ences. 
In the next section we describe the geometric setting for the problem and 
state the basic theorems. Section 3 will be devoted to the first part of the 
proof of these results; the remainder of the proof is in Section 4. In Section 
5 we will state some extensions of our basic results. One extension allows 
indifference among alternatives to be admitted in the group outcome; 
another permits a wider range of voting systems-systems uch as approval 
voting, where for a given ordinal ranking, a voter has several possible ways 
in which to vote. There is an interesting corollary corresponding to these 
more general systems which results from the fact that each voter has several 
different ways of voting, all of which are compatible with the voter’s ranking 
of the alternatives. This means that it is possible to have the same general 
voting system with the same voters, but any election could yield any one of 
several arbitrarily different group outcomes; the particular outcome would 
depend upon the choice made by the voters as to how to cast one from their 
selection of votes. At the conclusion of the paper there is a brief discussion 
describing how imposing restrictions upon the voters’ preferences can effect 
these “paradoxes.” 
2. FORMULATION AND STATEMENT OF THEOREMS 
Assume there are n > 2 alternatives denoted by a(l), u(2), . . . , a(n). We 
start this section by providing a geometric representation for the n! possible 
ordinal rankings of these alternatives. 
Let each coordinate axis of n-dimensional Euclidean space correspond to 
an alternative. Then a n-vector corresponds (monotonically) to a cardinal 
ranking of the alternatives if the value of each coordinate is interpreted as 
representing the intensity of preference for the associated alternative. Thus 
x(i) > x(j), where x(k) denotes the kth coordinate value, implies that 
alternative a(i) is preferred to a(j). Similarly, the hyperplane x(i) = x(j) 
represents indifference between the two alternatives, and it divides n-space 
into two regions each of which denotes the appropriate strict preference 
between a(i) and a(j). All possible hyperplanes of this type divide n-space 
into n ! cones, where each open cone represents a unique ordinal ranking of 
the u(i)‘s which does not admit indifference among alternatives. We will 
call such an ordinal ranking of the alternatives a “strict ranking.” The 
hyperplanes, and the intersection among hyperplanes, represent ordinal 
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rankings where indifference among alternatives is permitted. All possible 
complete, transitive, ordinal rankings are thus represented by some region. 
For example, the line given by scalar multiples of vector e = (l/n)(l, . . . , 1) 
corresponds to the ranking of complete indifference among all of the 
alternatives. This line is the intersection of all of the above described 
hyperplanes. 
The above regions which represent he ordinal rankings are equivalence 
classes of cardinal rankings of the alternatives. The dimension of this 
representation can be reduced by one in the following manner: Let P(n) be 
the intersection of the positive orthant of n-space with the hyperplane given 
by Cy(i) = 1. P(n) is an (n - I)-dimensional simplex, and its intersection 
with the above construction provides a representation of the ordinal ranking 
regions on this simplex. P(3), along with its ranking regions, is given in Fig. 
1. We shall use P(n) to represent both the simplex and the simplex divided 
into the ordinal ranking regions. Note that the ordinal ranking of complete 
indifference is always given by point e, so we will call e the “complete 
indifference point.” Also note that the open regions are symmetrically 
located about e and that the hyperplanes give a baricentric division of 
P(n)- 
It is in this way we see that the set of transitive ordinal rankings is an 
(n - 1)-dimen sional set. (This can be established with a more abstract 
representation for the ordinal rankings, one which is not dependent upon a 
cardinal representation of the alternatives. However, such abstraction is not 
required for our present purposes.) This higher dimensionality and the 
various symmetry groups it permits play an important role in what follows. 
Indeed, it appears that this higher dimensionality resulting from n > 2 is 
the cause of several of the different anomalies and paradoxes described in 
the social choice literature (Saari [4]). Next, we shall describe a class 
of weighted voting systems. Although the definition is given in terms of 
vectors, it is what one would expect: either the voters cast the larger of 
assigned weights for more favored alternatives or they cast the smaller. The 
group outcome is determined by the sum cast for each alternative and the 
ranking is in accordance with the method of assignment. 
DEFINITION 1. Assume there are n > 1 alternatives. A “weighted voting 
system” which ordinally ranks the n alternatives is one which satisfies the 
following: 
1. Assign n real numbers w(i), i = 1,2,. . . , n, which are not all the 
same. The n! ways these numbers, or weights, can be permuted to define 
n-vectors form the n! weight vectors W(k), k = 1,. . . , n!. 
2. Each weight vector is assigned to one and only one of the n! strict 
ordinal rankings of the n alternatives. A monotone method is one where 
each assigned vector lies in the closure of its open ranking region (in 
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n-space) in that algebraically larger weights are assigned to more favored 
alternatives. A reversed system is one where the reversal of the assigned 
vector lies in the closure of its open ranking region; that is, algebraically 
smaller weights are assigned to more favored alternatives. The reversed 
vector is obtained by multiplying the given vector by the scalar (- 1). The 
assignment of weight vectors must define either a monotone or a reversed 
system. 
3. Each voter casts the weight vector assigned to the region which 
reflects the voter’s strict ordering of the n alternatives. The vector sum is 
taken of all of the cast weight vectors. For a monotone system, the ranking 
region in which this sum lies defines the group ordinal ranking. For a 
reversed system, the group ranking is determined by the location of the 
reversed sum vector. 
The first condition is fairly obvious. If all the weights were the same, then 
the group outcome would always be complete indifference-this would not 
be a very interesting system! The requirement hat the voting systems must 
be either monotone or reversed is imposed for convenience of exposition; 
the results obtained in this paper do not depend upon this condition. 
Moreover, while there may be applications for systems not satisfying this 
condition, I do not know what they are. Indeed, the only justification for 
introducing such a wider class of systems of which I currently could 
conceive would be to show that the type of result presented here does not 
require any of the usual “Pareto” or “monotonicity” conditions common to 
the social choice literature. The reader interested in generalizing to this more 
general setting can find the basic approach outlined in [3].’ 
In sentence 2, the statement hat either the assignment process for the 
monotone or for the reversed system has the weight vectors in the closure of 
the appropriate ranking class easily can be verified by using the fact that 
either the weight vector, or its reversal, corresponds to a particular cardinal 
ranking of the alternatives. The same approach shows that the weight 
vectors are on the boundary of these open regions if and only if at least two 
of the assigned weights have the same values. 
It is obvious that adding a fixed multiple of e to all of the weight vectors 
will not effect the outcome of the election. Therefore we can and will assume 
that all the weights are non-negative. Furthermore, since the outcome is also 
invariant with respect to positive scalar multiples of these vectors, we 
assume that aN weight vectors lie in p(n). This scalar invariance holds true 
for the sum of the cast vectors, so we scale the sum and assume that it too 
lies in P(n). This scaling is achieved by dividing the sum vector by the 
‘Note added WI proof. This more general statement urned out to be the key step in extending 
Theorem 3 to Include the N(N - 1)/Z pairs of alternatives. That is, for each of these pairs, 
designate one of them. Then, a version of Theorem 3 holds where, for each pair, a majority of 
the same voters prefer the designated alternative 
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number of voters. In this way the group outcome can be viewed as being 
convex combinations of the weight vectors. When we use this interpretation, 
we impose the restriction that the scalars are all fractions- the common 
denominator, or some multiple of it corresponds to the number of voters 
while the numerators, or their appropriate multiple, correspond to the 
number of voters casting a particular weight vector. 
Next, we define what we mean when we say that there are “j completely 
different weighted voting systems.” First the formal definition will be 
presented, and then we will discuss it. 
DEFINITION 2. Let n > 1 alternatives be given. Assume that j weighted 
voting methods are given where for the i th system W(i) is the weight vector 
corresponding to the ranking a(l) > a(2) > . * * > a(n). The j voting 
systems are said to be “completely different” or “value independent” if the 
j + 1 vectors W(l), . . . , W(j), e are linearly independent. 
In this definition, the ordinal ranking a(l) > . . . > u(n) was chosen for 
convenience. One reason is that for a monotone method the weight vector 
W(i) has the weights given in a non-increasing order. However, it will 
become clear from the proof that any strict ordinal ranking could have been 
used to reach an equivalent definition. (This is not true had we admitted 
systems which were neither monotone nor reversed.) 
When j = 2, the above definition includes the one used by Fishburn [2] 
to say that two monotone methods differ. To see what the above definition 
means, consider two systems which are not different. Then one is given by a 
scalar multiple of the other plus some multiple of e. Neither multiples of e 
nor scalar multiples of a weight vector can effect the outcome of an election, 
so the results in any election must always agree. For example, should n = 4, 
then the Borda weight vector W(1) = (4,3,2,1) and the reversed system 
with weight vector (0, 1,2,3) are the same. 
In our geometric setting vector e plays a special role because it is 
orthogonal to the simplex P(n), thus multiples of it do not project onto any 
of the other regions of P(n). If W is a weight vector, then the vector W - e 
lies in the translated simplex P(n) - e and it is orthogonal to e. Conse- 
quently, if two weighted voting systems do not differ, then their weight 
vectors, which correspond to the same strict ordinal ranking, must lie on the 
same line in P(n) - e passing through point 0. (This follows from the fact 
that in any region of P(n), one of the weight vectors lies on the hyperplane 
defined by e and the other weight vector. By what we have shown, this 
two-dimensional hyperplane intersects P(n) in a line passing through e.) 
The converse is obviously true. Therefore, when we have a system of 
completely different weighting systems, we can assume that all of the weight 
vectors for all of the systems lie on the same sphere in P(n) with center e. 
If j weighted voting systems are not completely different, then it is easy 
to see that the outcome of some one system is always given by a fixed linear 
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combination of the (j - 1) other systems; thus if the systems were not 
completely different, the type of result described in the Introduction would 
not be possible. (Indeed, this observation can be used to show that the 
theorems which follow are “best possible” for the types of paradoxes which 
are presented.) Since P(n) - e has dimension (n - l), it follows im- 
mediately that there can be at most (n - 1) systems in a collection of 
completely different weighted voting systems. Also, it follows that one can 
always find (n - 1) completely different systems. If n = 2, then there can be 
only one system. 
The above statements which derive immediately from linear algebra and 
from the fact that the rotational symmetries of P(n) have e as the center 
point, play an important role in the proof of the following theorem. 
THEOREM 1. For n > 1 alternatives, assume given a collection of j com- 
pletely difirent weighted voting systems. Let A(l), A(2), . . . , A(j) be any j 
strict ordinal rankings. There exist examples of voters ’ preferences such that 
when the same voters use the ith voting system, the group outcome is A(i), 
i=l ,***, J 
For n = 2 the proof of this theorem is obvious as in this case j = 1, so for 
what follows we shall assume that n > 2. If we restrict the voting systems to 
be monotone, j = 2 and A(2) to be the reversal of A(l), we obtain 
Fishburn’s theorem. 
To further illustrate this theorem we consider a special case where n = 4, 
where one of the voting systems is a plurality vote, one is the usual Borda 
method, and the third system is a reversed system which has each voter 
casting one vote for each of the bottom two alternatives. The outcomes for 
the corollary were selected to demonstrate what can occur. 
COROLLARY 1.1. For n = 4 alternatives, let the weight vectors for three 
voting methods be W(1) = (LO, O,O), W(2) = (4,3,2, l), and W(3) = 
(0, 0, 1,l). (System 3 is a reversed system.) Let three ordinal rankings of the 
alternatives be A(1) = (a(1) > a(2) > a(3) > a(4)); A(2) = (a(4) > a(2) > 
a(3) > a(1)); and A(3) = (a(3) > a(4) > a(1) > a(2)). There exist examples 
of voters ’ preferences so that when the same voters use system W(i), the 
outcome is ranking A(i), i = 1,2,3. 
This theorem illustrates that for completely different systems there need 
not be any relationship whatsoever among the outcomes. The next theorem 
states that the same holds as some alternatives are eliminated. This implies 
that one should not interpret the group outcome as a linear ordering. 
THEOREM 2. For n > 2 alternatives, let S(j), j = 2,3,, . . , n, be a subset 
consisting of j of the alternatives where set S(j) is a subset of S(k) if j < k. 
For each j select a weighted voting system. Let A(j) be some strict ranking of 
the alternatives in set S(j). Then there exist examples of voters ’ preferences 
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such that for all choices of j, when the same voters use the designated voting 
system on S(j), the outcome is A(j). 
The final theorem given in this section combines the above. 
THEOREM 3. Let sets S(j), j = 2,3,. . . , n, be as described in Theorem 2. 
For j alternatives, select (j - 1) completely diflerent voting systems, j = 
2 ,*-., n, and then label them with an integer between 1 andj - 1 according to 
the order in which they were selected. For i = 1,. . . , j - 1, let A(i, j) be any 
strict ranking of the alternatives in S(j). Then, there exist examples of voters ’ 
preferences such that for all choices of i and j, when the same voters rank the 
elements of S(j) by use of the i th given voting system, then the outcome is 
Ati, j). 
This theorem will be illustrated by use of three systems: the common 
plurality voting system, the Borda count, and the method of voting for the 
top two alternatives. The corollary illustrates that the conclusions can 
flip-flop with the number of alternatives and with the choice of voting 
system. 
COROLLARY 3.1. Let S(j) consist of the alternatives a(l), . , . , a( j), 
j = 3,4,. . . , n. There exist examples of voters’ preferences so that when the 
same voters rank the elements of S(j) by use of the Borda Count (weight 
vector (j, j - l,..., 1)) the group outcome is a(1) > a(2) > . . . > a(j) 
when j is an even integer, and it is the reversal of this ranking when j is an odd 
integer. On the other hand, when the same group of voters rank the elements of 
S(j) by use of a plurality vote (weight vector (l,O, . . . ,O)), the outcome 
always is the reversal of the Borda outcome. Finally, for j > 3, if the same 
voters use the weight vector (1, LO,. . . , 0), then the outcome is a(j) > a(1) > 
a( j - 1) > a(2) > . . . should j be a multiple of 3, the reversal of this should 
j + 1 be a multiple of 3, and the Borda outcome should j + 2 be a multiple 
of 3. 
The title of this paper refers to all three of these theorems, but in 
particular to Theorem 3. By chaos, we mean complete disorder or the lack 
of predictability of the system. The choice of the word “chaos” is selected to 
reflect both this generic usage of the word as well as to provoke comparisons 
with its technical usage coming from dynamical systems. In the dynamical 
systems literature, chaos is used to mean the existence of a subsystem of a 
deterministic dynamical system which is highly “random.” (As an example 
of how this applies to Newton’s method for finding zeros of polynomials, 
see [5].) The statement of the theorems in this current paper fulfills this 
requirement: The weights and the voters’ preferences create a deterministic 
system: Yet, for a random selection of outcomes, a subsystem can be found 
(subset of voters’ preferences) for which this system realizes the specified 
outcome. 
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On a first reading the reader may wish to skip the proofs, given in the 
next two sections, and turn to Section 5 to see some of the other results. 
3. PROOF OF THEOREMS 
The proofs of all three theorems are similar. First we define mappings 
which describe a scaling of the vector sums cast by the voters. These 
mappings will be defined in the order in which the theorems are stated. 
Next, we shall assert that these mappings are open mappings. From this 
assertion, it will be shown how the conclusions of the theorems follow. The 
proof of the crucial assertion that the mappings are open will be provided in 
Section 4. 
Proof of Theorem 1. Assume that A(l), . . . , A(j), j < n, are j strict 
orderings of the n alternatives. Also assume given j completely different 
voting methods where the corresponding weight vectors are W(l), . . . , W(j). 
There are n! strict ordinal rankings among the n alternatives. Because these 
rankings lie in a higher dimensional space, they possess no natural ordering. 
Therefore, arbitrarily impose an order on these rankings and let W(k, i), 
i=l,..., j, k=l,..., n !, denote the weight vector from the ith system 
which corresponds to the kth ranking of the alternatives. Let f: P(n!) --f 
(P(n) x . * * x P(n)) (this is a j-fold Cartesian product of P(n) with itself) 
be defined as 
f(4)>..., c(4) = (~c@)Wk l), . . ., Cc(k)W(k, i,). (3.1) 
k k 
Since the W( k, i)‘s all lie in P(n) and since the c( k)‘s are non-negative 
numbers which sum to unity, each of the j sums given in the definition of f 
are convex combinations of the appropriate weight vectors for that system. 
Therefore each sum lies in P(n); this implies that f is well defined. 
Function f can be interpreted in the following way: If the c( i)‘s are rational 
numbers with a common denominator, then the denominator can be viewed 
as being the total number of voters and the numerator of c(k) is the 
number of voters whose preferences correspond to the k th ranking of the 
alternatives. 
We claim that when all of the c(i)‘s equal (l/n!), the image of f is 
(e, e,. . . , e). This choice for the c’s corresponds to point e in P(n!), so the 
claim is that f(e) = (e, . . . , e). To see why this is so, note that each 
alternative is ranked in m th place in precisely (n - l)! of the n ! possible 
orderings of the alternatives. This is true for each m = 1,. . , , n. Now, for 
any fixed voting system, the ranking of a(i) determines which weight is in 
the i th coordinate position. Therefore, each of the weights appears in the 
ith coordinate position in precisely (n - l)! of the n ! weight vectors 
{W(k,i), k = l,..., n !}. So for this choice of c’s, the i th coordinate of the 
fth component of the range of f is the sum of the weights for the Ith system 
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times (n - l)!/n!. Since the weights sum to unity, each coordinate in this 
sum has value l/n. This completes the proof of the claim. 
Fundamental to the proof of this theorem is the following lemma: 
LEMMA 1. For j completely diflerent weighted voting systems, function f is 
an open mapping. That is, f maps open sets in P(n!) to open sets in the range. 
The proof of this crucial lemma will be given in the next section. 
Because e lies on the boundary of all of the open ranking regions Z(i) of 
P(n), it follows from the definition of the product topology that point 
(e,. . . , e) is a boundary point of Z(1) x . . . x Z( j), where the ith factor 
Z(i) in this j-fold Cartesian product is an arbitrary open ranking region of 
P(n). 
Consider an open neighborhood U of point e in P(n!). According to the 
lemma, set f(U) is an open set I/ in P(n) x * . . x P(n) which contains the 
point (e,..., e). This means that the intersection of V with the j-fold 
product of the open ranking regions corresponding to A(l), . . . , A(j), 
respectively, is a non-empty open set. Because the set of vectors with 
rational components is dense in P(n!), it follows that there is a vector d in 
Uwith the property that f(d) is in this intersection. 
Vector d is used to create the asserted example of voters. The total 
number of voters corresponds to the common denominator of the compo- 
nents of d, while the numerator of the k th component corresponds to the 
number of voters possessing the k th ranking of the alternatives. By con- 
struction when these voters use the ith voting system, the outcome is strict 
ranking A(i). Only the lemma remains to be proved. 
Proof of Theorem 2. Assume that the n alternatives are a(l), 
a(2), . . . , a(n) and that set S(j) consists of the first j alternatives. Let 
A(j), j = 2,3 ,..., n, be some ranking of the elements of set S(j). Assume 
that W(j) is the weight vector which defines the weighted voting system to 
be used to rank the elements of S(j). 
In our proof of this theorem, we will need to be more careful in the 
labeling of the n! strict rankings of the n alternatives. Toward this end, note 
that on set S(j) there are j! strict ordinal rankings. Each of these rankings 
are related to (j + 1) rankings on the set S( j + 1); these are the rankings 
which correspond to the (j + 1) different ways alternative a( j + 1) can be 
positioned within the given ranking. So, for any ranking B(j) on set S(j), 
call the (j + 1) rankings on set S( j + 1) which are obtained in this fashion 
as belonging to the “lift of B(j).” (See [3].) 
As in the proof of Theorem 1, we will be defining a series of maps, each 
of which is intended to capture the voting procedures described in the 
statement of the theorem. Start with a two-vector on P(2); one of the 
components is intended to represent the proportion of voters preferring 
alternative a(1) to a(2) while the other component corresponds to the 
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proportion having the preference a(2) > a(1). Next, take a vector from 
P(3) x P(3). The three vector corresponding to the first factor P(3) is 
intended to represent the three elements in the lift of (a(l) > a(2)); each 
component denotes the fraction of these voters choosing a particular strict 
ranking in the lift. In the same way, the vector coming from the second 
factor P(3) denotes the S(3) fractional splitting of the voters preferring u(2) 
to u(l). Continue this construction from one level to the next; correspond- 
ing to each ranking in P(j), we associate a vector from P(j + I). The 
components of this vector describe the proportions of those voters which 
have this same P(j) ranking but which possess the various rankings in the 
lift. Therefore going from the jth to the (j + 1)th stage requires a j! fold 
product of P( j + 1) with itself. This gives a (j + l)! vector where each 
component corresponds to one of the strict rankings of S(j + 1). The 
mappings given below are defined in accordance with this description. 
For each j, j = 2,3,. . . , n, define mapping g(j) from P(2) x ( P(3)2! 
X . . . X(P(j))(Jpl)! + P(j) as 
g(A o(L2); D&3), 0(2,3); . . . . D(U) ,... ,D((j - l)!, j)) 
= C44 14 C4.L ~,3)(...(Cd(k,p,J)W(k,j))...)). 
(3.2) 
Here, vector D(i, j) = (d(1, i. j), d(2, i, j), . . . , d(j, i, j)) is an element of 
P(j). The order of the summations given in this equation are defined as 
follows: Each i in D(i, j) corresponds to one of the (j)! ordinal rankings 
on S(j), call it B(i, j). In Eq. (3.2) each coefficient of D(i, j) is a scalar 
multiple of a summation containing j + 1 of the coordinates of vector 
D(k, j + 1). The appropriate choice and indicing of these j + 1 terms, 
d(t, k, j + l), is to correspond to those rankings in the lift of B(i, j). The 
middle index is to identify the ranking which defines the lift, while the first 
index describes which element in the lift is being considered. In the 
innermost summation, each of the coefficients are also multiplied by 
the weight vector for the appropriate ranking in the lift coming from the 
proceeding level. 
The same argument given above for function f holds to show that 
s(j; eye,. . . , e) = e. Note, vector e can lie in a different dimensional space 
with each appearance in this equation. 
Because g is linear, it follows that function g(j) is an open mapping if its 
image contains an open set. To see why this is so, we shall show that this 
occurs even with the restriction that D(k) = e for k < j, and the (j - l)! 
different D( i, j)‘s remain variables. With this restriction, g(j) is a function 
of (j)! variables. This mapping is open if and only if its Jacobean Dg is of 
maximum rank. However, with this restriction, the Jacobean turns out to be 
equivalent to the Jacobean of one of the component maps of function f 
given in Eq. (3.1). Thus the open mapping property of g(j) follows from 
Lemma 1. 
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Let V be an open neighborhood of e in P(n). By the continuity of g(n) 
and the condition that (e, . . . , e) is mapped to e, the inverse image of V 
with respect to g is an open neighborhood U containing (e, e, . . . , e). This 
and the open mapping property of g (hence g is sujective) implies there is 
a choice for vectors D(i, n), say H(i, n), such that g(e, e, . . . ; 
m, n>, * * f, H((n - l)!, n)) lies in the non-empty intersection of set V with 
the open ranking region corresponding to ranking A(n). (Recall, ranking 
A(n) is the arbitrarily selected ordering of the elements of S(n).) In fact, the 
inverse image of this new open set in P(n) yields an open neighborhood of 
point (e, e, . . . , e; H(1, n), . . . , H((n - l)!, n)). Let U(2) X U(3) 
X . . . X U(n) be a still smaller open set in the domain which is constructed 
by the (n - 2) fold Cartesian product of open sets coming from the factors 
which define the domain of g. Here U(i), i = 2,. . . , n - 1, is an open 
neighborhood of (e, . . . , e) in the (i - l)! product of P(i) with itself, and 
U(n) is an open neighborhood of (H(1, n),...,H((n - l)!,n)) in the 
(n - l)! fold product of P(n) with itself. Since U(n) is an open neighbor- 
hood, we can assume that the coordinates of the point H(i, n) are all 
rational numbers. 
We now continue this argument backward from one level of alternatives 
to the next level containing one fewer alternative. Suppose that at level 
(j + 1) we have that the vectors D(i, k), k = 1,. . . , j, lie in the product 
U(l) x . . . x U(j) which is a neighborhood of point (e, . . . , e). Fixing the 
variables at the first (j - 1) levels to be e, we have that g(j) takes open set 
U(j) to an open neighborhood of e in P(j). This open neighborhood has a 
non-empty intersection with the open ranking region corresponding to 
A(j). The inverse image of this open set created by this intersection 
contains a still smaller product set of open sets of (e, . . . , e) in the (k - l)! 
fold product of P(k), k = 2,. . . , j - 1, and an open subset of U(j). In this 
open subset of U(j) select a point with rational components 
(WL jh.. . , H(( j - l)!, j)). Continue this argument at the j - 1 level 
using the smaller product set of open sets just derived. 
According to the construction of set U(2) x - . . x U(n), and the sub- 
sequent product subsets of projections of this set, g( j; H(1, 2); 
- Ml, j), . . . , . ..) H(( j - l)!, j)) lies in the open ranking region of P(j) 
which corresponds to ranking A(j), j = 2,. . . , n. Next we show how to 
find the appropriate rational equivalent representation of points 
H(1,2); . . . ; H((n - l)!, n) so that it provides the example of voters asserted 
in the statement of the theorem. 
The desired rational equivalent representation of these points will be 
obtained through a finite iterative process. 
1. Rewrite vector H(l, 2) so that the two components have a common 
denominator. 
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2. Each component, h(i, k, j), of H(k, j) corresponds to some rank- 
ing, B(i, k, j), of the set S(j), j = 2,. . . , n - 1. One of the H( j + 1) 
vectors corresponds to the lift of B(i, k, j); rewrite the coefficients of this 
vector so that their common denominator is a multiple of the numerator of 
h(i, k, j). 
3. Rewrite each component of the H(j) vectors, j = 2,. . . , n, so that 
the numerator of each component is the same as the common denominator 
of the elements of the appropriate H(j + 1) vector corresponding to the lift 
of B(i, k, j). 
After this process is completed, the common denominator of H(1,2) 
yields the total number of voters in the example. The numerators of the 
components of the H(i, j) vectors specify the number of voters holding the 
corresponding ranking of the alternatives in S(j). By construction, when 
these voters consider j alternatives using the designated voting system, the 
result is equivalent to evaluating function g(j) at these H points. By 
construction, this outcome is A(j). This completes the proof of Theorem 2. 
Proof of Theorem 3. The proof of this theorem is obtained by simple 
modifications and combination of ideas from the above two proofs. Assume 
the j - 1 rankings of the alternatives in S(j) have been made and the 
(j - 1) completely different voting methods have been selected. Define a 
series of mappings G(j) which have the same domain as g(j) but which 
have range the (j - 1) fold Cartesian product of P(j) with itself, j = 
2 , . . . , n. The j - 1 different functions defining G(j) are essentially the 
same as g(j), they differ only in the choice of the j - 1 different weight 
vectors selected to correspond to the different voting systems. The argument 
showing that g, or f, take (e, . . . , e) to e extends directly to G(j). The fact 
that when all the variables below the jth are fixed at e and G(j) is still an 
open mapping follows from Lemma 1 and a Jacobean argument similar to 
the one used for g(j). Thus we have that there is an open set in the domain 
of G(n) containing e’s for all but the nth level which is mapped into the 
appropriate ranking region in the appropriate factor of the n - l-fold 
Cartesian product. The same reduction argument as presented in the proof 
of Theorem 2 further restricts these open sets so that G(j) will have the 
appropriate image. The rational representation argument is the same as 
given above. 
Thus, the proofs of all three theorems are completed once we establish the 
validity of Lemma 1. This will be done in the next section. 
4. hOOF OF LEMMA 1 
Function f, given in the statement of Lemma 1, is a linear map where the 
dimension of the range is j(n - 1). For n > 2, this dimension is less than 
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that of the domain which is (n! - 1). (Here we use the fact that j < n.) To 
prove the lemma, it suffices to show that the Jacobean map Df, which maps 
the tangent space of P(n!) to the tangent space of the j-fold product of 
P(n) with itself, is smjective. If the weight vectors are W(l), W(2), , . . , W(j), 
then the column vectors of Df are the transpose of the vectors 
{ Wj, 11,. . . , W(i, j)}, where i ranges from 1 to n ! and this index desig- 
nates which of the n! rankings of s(n) is being considered. 
This matrix representation of Df treats f as a mapping from n! dimen- 
sional space rather than from the subspace P( n!). Consequently, when the 
rank of Df is determined, it is equivalent to finding j(n - 1) columns 
which are linearly independent with respect to those scalars which define 
vectors in the tangent space ZY’(n!). Since the normal vectors to P(n!) or 
TP(n!) are scalar multiples of e, the condition imposed on the scalars is 
that they define vectors orthogonal to e; that is, the sum of these scalars 
must equal zero. 
In order to remove this constraint on the scalars, extend f from P( n !) to 
n !-space. It is clear that if f is an open mapping on this new domain, it is an 
open mapping on the restriction to P(n!). The only impact this extension of 
f has on the range is that the range now includes scalar multiples of any 
element from the range of the original function f. Thus, this new range is 
P(n) x *** x P( n) X R, where R denotes the real line. In this new setting, 
f is a linear mapping if and only if Df has rank j(n - 1) + 1, but since the 
tangent space is n!-space, no longer are there any constraints on the scalars 
when this rank condition is being verified. 
The same argument used to show that f(e) = (e, . . . , e) carries over to 
demonstrate that a linear combination of the columns of Df yields a 
column vector which is the transpose of (e, . . . , e). Therefore, the problem 
of showing that Df has maximal rank is the same as finding j(n - 1) 
choices of k such that the resulting set of j(n - 1) vectors { W(k, 1) - 
e , . . . , W(k, j) - e} is linearly independent; there are no constraints on the 
choice of the scalars. 
Since we will be considering vectors of the type ((W(1, k) - 
6.. . , Wj, k) - e)), we simplify the notation by denoting such a vector on 
(P(n) - e) X . * * X (P(n) - e) as Z(k). If A is a linear map mapping 
P(n) - e back into itself, then we ‘extend A to the product space by 
defining A(Z(k)) to be { A(W(1, k) - e), . . . , A(W(j, k) - e))}. The linear 
mappings in which we are interested are the transposition maps M(I, m) 
which map n-space back onto itself but which interchange the Ith and the 
mth coordinates. It is easy to show that these maps map (P(n) - e) back 
into itself. 
These transposition maps are the mappings which take one Z vector onto 
another, and for any two Z vectors, there is some combination of transposi- 
tion mappings which takes one onto the other. (This is because the trans- 
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position maps generates the permutation maps.) Therefore, the linear space 
spanned by the vectors Z(k), k = 1,2,. . . , n!, is invariant with respect to 
these mappings, where by being invariant we mean that the linear space is 
mapped back into itself. We need to show that this space generated by the 
Z’s has dimension j(n - 1). The way we do this is to classify the invariant 
spaces with respect o certain classes of mappings. 
DEFINITION 3. Let G be some set of linear mappings which map a 
vector space VS back into itself. Then L(G) is the set of linear subspaces of 
I’S which are invariant with respect o all the mappings in G. 
It is an elementary exercise to show that L(G) is the intersection of the 
sets L(g), where g ranges over the elements of G. Therefore, the problem is 
to determine what subspaces are invariant with respect o each linear map g 
in G. One approach, of course, is to determine the eigenvalues and the 
corresponding eigenspaces of each mapping g. By using the eigenvectors as 
a basis for T/S, it is fairly easy to compute the invariant subspaces. This is 
the approach we shall use to analyze the following two examples; these 
examples are designed to complete the proof of Lemma 1. A different 
approach can be found in Lemma 2. 
EXAMPLE 1. Let G be the set of all transposition matrices, M(k, I), on 
n-space. We will show that L(G) consists of n-space, (P(n) - e), the space 
spanned by e, or the zero-dimensional space 0. Once this fact is established, 
the proof of Lemma 1 follows for j = 1. This is because since a weight 
vector cannot be a multiple of e, the L(G) invariant subspace spanned by 
(W(k,l) - e), k = 1, . . . . n!, must contain (P(n) - e). Thus, establishing 
the claim of this example completes the proof of Theorem 2. 
In the proof of this claim, it will be useful to have a basis for the linear 
space spanned by (P(n) - e). This is easy to determine because the n 
vertices of the simplex P(n), e(i), i = 1,. . . , n, are linearly independent. 
(Here, vector e(i) is the unit vector which has zero for all components but 
the ith, and that component is unity.) Therefore, the n - I vectors e(1) - 
e(i), i = 2,..., n, are linearly independent and they lie in this translated, 
space. Consequently, they will serve as a basis for P(n) - e. 
The eigenvalues of M(k, I) are simple eigenvalue - 1 and eigenvalue 1 
with multiplicity (n - 1). The eigenspace corresponding to - 1 is the space 
spanned by the vector having zero in all components except the k th and the 
Ith. For these components, the values are the same, but they differ in sign. 
Denote this vector by {e(k), -e(l)}. The eigenspace corresponding to 
eigenvalue 1 is the n - l-dimensional space orthogonal to {e(k), -e(l)}. 
From this eigenspace decomposition, it follows that any element of 
L(M( k, I)) is a linear subspace which is either orthogonal to the dis- 
tinguished eigenvector, or it includes it. 
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Let V be an element of L(G), and project V onto the subspace spanned 
by {e(k), -e(j)}. Since the span of the space generated by (P(n) - e) 
consists of vectors of this type, it follows that should this projection be 0 for 
all choices of k and j, then V is either 0 or the one-dimensional space 
spanned by e. Therefore, assume for some choice of k and j that this 
projection is non-trivial. By what we have shown above, this means that Y 
contains this vector. Let 1 be any other index. According to the definition of 
L(G), subspace V must be invariant with respect to M( k, I) and M( j, 1). 
But Wk WW, -e(j))> = {e(O, -e(j)) and Wj, O({ e(k), 
-e(j)}) = {e(k), -e(l)}. By continuing this argument, it is clear that V 
contains (P(n) - e). This means that either it is this space, or it is n-space. 
In either case, this completes the proof of the claim. 
EXAMPLE 2. Let the vector space be the j-fold Cartesian product of 
n-space with itself. The set of mappings we will consider are the same as in 
Example 1, the transposition mappings from n-space back into itself. Here 
we will use the mappings according to the convention described above; 
namely, any mapping is applied to all j factors of this j-fold product. (This 
is equivalent to choosing the diagonal of the j-fold product of set G with 
itself.) Rather than determining all of the elements of L(G), we will classify 
only enough of the elements o that we can prove Lemma 1. 
For M( j, k), the eigenvalue - 1 has multiplicity j while the eigenvalue 1 
has multiplicity j(n - 1). A basis for the j-dimensional eigenspace corre- 
sponding to eigenvalue -1 can be constructed with the products of j - 1 
zero vectors (from n-space) with vector {e(j), -e(k)}; for each of the j 
vectors, this non-zero n-vector component corresponds to a different factor 
of the j-fold product. The orthogonal complement of this space is the 
j(n - l)-dimensional eigenspace for eigenvalue 1. Any subspace invariant 
with respect to M( j, k) must either be orthogonal to the (- 1) eigenspace, 
or it must contain a linear subspace coming from it. 
Let V be an element of L(G). Now, it is fairly easy to show that if the 
dimension of Y lies between j(n - 1) and jn, then V is the j-fold product 
of n-space and (P(n) - e). The number of factors (in this Cartesian 
product) which correspond to the last space equals the difference between 
jn and the dimension of V. Therefore, assume that the dimension of V is 
less than that of j(n - 1). Furthermore, because our goal is the completion 
of the proof of Lemma 1, we will be concerned with the special case where Y 
is a subspace of the j-fold Cartesian product of (P(n) - e). 
If the projection of I/ onto the j-fold product of the space spanned by 
{e(k) -e(O) ’ t is rivial for all choices of k, I, then I/ is orthogonal to our 
desired product space. So, assume for some choice of indices that this 
projection is non-trivial. If this projection contains the j-dimensional eigen- 
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space corresponding to eigenvalue - 1, then the argument given for Exam- 
ple 1 applies to show that V contains the j-fold product of (P(n) - e). 
Next, assume that this projection of Y on the M( k, I) - 1 eigenspace is a 
d-dimensional space, where D(i; k, 1), i = 1,. . . , d < j, is the basis for the 
subspace. Each vector D(i; k, ,) is determined by the coefficients in its 
representation in terms of the distinguished eigenvectors. The coefficients 
define a d x j matrix. Using standard linear algebra tools, in particular the 
techniques related to row reduction of matrices, we can assume that the 
basis was selected so that the matrix is in a row reduced form. Furthermore, 
in order to simplify the exposition, assume that the indicing is such that the 
first d columns yields a d x d identity matrix. Now, for any other index, 
m, we have M( m, I)( D( i; k, 1)) = D( i; m, I), a vector which is determined 
by the same coefficients. In this way we have the basis for the projection of 
I/onto the various subspaces. The argument used in Example 1, and the 
basis of (P(n) - e), apply to show that the first d components of V are 
given by the d-fold Cartesian product of (P(n) - e) with itself. Indeed, by 
this choice of the basis vectors, it follows directly that the subspace 
determined by these D’s has dimension d( n - 1) and it has the graph 
representation (J(l), J(2), . . . , J(d), J(d + 1), . . . , J(i)), where J(i), i = 
1 , . . . , d, is an arbitrary element of (P(n) - e) and where J(k), k = d + 
1 , . . . , i, is a specific linear combination of the first d vectors. 
We are now prepared to return to Lemma 1. The weight vectors coming 
from the j completely different voting systems define vector Z(k), k = 
n!, which lies in a L(G) invariant subspace Vof the j-fold product of 
&ii\ - e). Th ese subspaces are described above. Since the n components 
of Z(1) are linearly independent, Y can only be the total product space, 
which has dimension j(n - 1). This completes the proof of Lemma 1, and 
consequently, this completes the proofs of the three theorems. 
5. SOME EXTENSIONS AND THE CONDORCET A'-TUPLE 
The purpose of this section is to extend the three theorems of Section 2 so 
that they apply to most weighted voting systems. Then, we conclude this 
section and the paper by briefly discussing the effects of imposing restrio 
tions on voters’ preferences; some restrictions still admit the conclusions of 
the theorems while others will admit only a subset of these results. 
In the statement of the three theorems, we required the group outcomes to 
be strict rankings of the n, or j < n, alternatives. This condition was used in 
two places in the proof; one was for convenience of exposition and the other 
was necessary to derive the general result. The reason we imposed this 
condition is that strict rankings define open regions in the ranking space 
Z-‘(n). We used this and the surjectivity of mappings f and g(j) to show 
304 DONALD G. SAARI 
that the inverse image of the appropriate ranking region is a non-empty 
subset of the domain. This use of the “strict rankings” is for convenience 
because even if the group ranking contained indifference between altema- 
tives, the surjectivity of the mappings would ensure that the inverse image of 
the ranking regions are non-empty. Although these inverse images no longer 
are open sets (they are parts of linear subspaces which have the same 
codimension as the ranking region in P(n)), straightforward arguments 
employing the continuity and surjectivity of these mappings can be used to 
show that there exist points in the domain which satisfy all but possibly one 
of the properties described in the proofs. The one property which does not 
necessarily follow (without having the flexibility of an open set in the 
domain) is that it is possible to choose appropriate domain points which 
have rational components. 
The reason a problem occurs at this point is that by admitting indif- 
ferences, the domain points must now satisfy linear equations which involve 
the weights. If the weights are rationally independent scalars, then the 
appropriate rational solution in the domain may not exist. On the other 
hand, I have never encountered a weighted voting system used in the “real 
world,” where the weights are irrational numbers! Consequently, even 
though the conditions imposed on the following theorem are far more strict 
than necessary to obtain the conclusion, the results most likely apply to all 
practical voting systems. 
THEOREM 4. In addition to the conditions imposed on the weighted voting 
systems in Theorems 1,2,3, assume that all of the weights are rational 
numbers. Then, the respective conclusions of these theorems hold even if the 
group rankings admit indiference among alternatives. 
We will illustrate this theorem with the following statement which follows 
from Theorem 2 and Theorem 4. 
COROLLARY 4.1. Assume given Jive alternatives a, b, c, d and f. Then 
there exist examples of voters so that when they rank a and b by means of 
plurality vote the outcome is complete indiflerence: when they rank a, b, and c 
with the Borda count, the outcome is a > c > 6; when they rank the four 
alternatives a, b, c, and d with a plurality vote, the outcome is b = d > c > a; 
yet when they rank allJive alternatives with the reversed system having weight 
vector (1,2,3,4,5), the outcome is a > f = d > b = d. 
A second way in which these theorems can be extended is to allow the 
voters to admit indifferences in their preferences. Of course, this is only 
meaningful should the voting system admit weight vectors which reflect this 
indifference among certain alternatives, this means that we are introducing 
additional weight vectors to correspond to all of the classes in the ranking 
regions of I’(n); not just the open ranking regions. But, if we are going to 
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introduce additional weight vectors, we might as well handle other situa- 
tions where additional weight vectors are available. In particular, I am 
referring to voting systems uch as approval voting where each voter casts 
the weight of unity for each approved alternative, or cardinal preference 
voting where each voter determines the weight to be cast for each alternative 
in accordance with the proportions of intensity of preference among the 
alternatives. What characterizes these systems is that there may be more 
than one weight vector corresponding to each ranking region of P(n). 
DEFINITION 4. Assume there are n > 1 alternatives. A general weighted 
voting system is one where at least one weight vector is assigned to each of 
the open ranking regions of P(n). Not all of these weight vectors assigned 
to an open ranking regions are to be scalar multiples of e. Furthermore, it is 
required that the assignment of the weight vectors to the open regions are 
either all monotone or reversed, as defined in Definition 1. 
THEOREM 5. For Theorems 1, 2, 3, and 4, assume that the described 
weighted voting systems are replaced with general weighted voting systems 
admitting a subsystem of weight vectors satisfying both Definition 1 and the 
conditions of the respective Theorems. Then the conclusions of the respective 
theorems apply. 
To prove this theorem, one modifies the definition of the mappings f and 
g(j) to admit the additional possibilities. Then, the conclusion of Theorem 
5 follows because we have established that it holds for a restriction imposed 
upon the same mappings. 
A general voting system can contain more than one weighted voting 
system which satisfy the conditions of Definition 1. An example of this 
would be a common voting method to determine the membership of a 
committee-a voter is told to vote for no more than a certain number of 
candidates. For example, suppose there are five candidates and you can vote 
for no more than three of them. This means that contained within the 
general system are three “completely different” weighted voting systems 
defined by the weight vectors (l,O,O,O,O), (l,l,O,O,O) or (l,l, l,O,O). 
Consequently, from Theorems 1,4, and 5, for any three rankings of the five 
alternatives, there exists examples of voters where the outcome could be any 
of these rankings, and the ranking actually selected depends on how the 
voters cast their possible ballots. This is an illustration of the following 
corollary of these three theorems. 
COROLLARY 5.1. Let n > 1 alternatives be given. Assume given a general 
voting system which includes as subsystems j completely diflerent weighed 
voting systems. Let A(l), A(2), . . . , A(j) be j rankings of the n alternatives. 
Then there exist examples of voters where any of these outcomes can occur 
when they use the general voting system to rank the alternatives; the particular 
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outcome depends upon how the voters choose to cast one of their several 
possible weight vectors. 
We now turn from the question of extensions to the issue of restrictions 
of the possible voters’ preferences. Implicit in the statement of the theorems 
and explicit in their proofs is the requirement that there are no restrictions 
on voters’ preferences. A natural question would be to determine what types 
of restrictions will still admit the conclusions of all these theorems and what 
types will not. From a technical point of view, the answer to this question 
will add further insight into the reasons for these various voting paradoxes. 
Since the proof of all three theorems depends upon the proof of Lemma 
1, this is the first place this question should be examined. Phrased in terms 
of this lemma and the tool used to prove it, the restrictions on voters’ 
preferences defines a new set G of mappings which are to be kept invariant, 
and we wish to find when is and when isn’t L(G) the appropriate full space. 
The second technical condition we need to prove the theorem is the 
symmetry one which requires that some interior point of the domain is 
mapped to e of the range. What we illustrate next is an important 
symmetrical set of preferences which satisfy both conditions. As a result, it 
should not be surprising that variants of them are found in several “counter- 
examples” or as the building blocks for “paradoxes” in the social choice 
literature. Because they are natural extensions of the set of three rankings on 
three alternatives used by Condorcet, we call them “Condorcet n-tuples”. 
(See [3,41.) 
DEFINITION 5. Assume there are n > 1 alternatives. Let B be some 
ranking of the alternatives b(1) > * *. > b(n), where each b(i) is some 
alternative a(k). The following set of n rankings of the alternatives i  called 
the Condorcet n-tuple generated by B. {B; b(n) > b(1) > . . . > 
b(n - 1); b(n - 1) > b(n) > b(1) > ..a > b(n - 2); . . . . b(2) > b(3) 
> . . . > b(n) > b(l)}. To get from one ranking to the next in this n-tuple, 
each alternative is lowered one position in the ranking while the least 
favored alternative now becomes the most favored alternative. 
If n = 2, then the Condorcet 2-tuple is (a > b; b ) a), where a and b 
are the two alternatives. Since the Condorcet n-tuple is defined in a cyclic 
fashion, it seems reasonable to expect he associated weight vectors to share 
a similar property. To see that they do, let P be the permutation matrix 
((p(i, j))), where p(i, j) = 1 if j = i + 1 for i = l,..., (n - 1) and if 
i = n, j = 1. Otherwise p(i,j) = 0. If W is the column weight vector 
associated with ranking B, then a simple computation shows that vector 
P(W) is the column weight vector associated with the next ranking in the 
Condorcet n-tuple. In general, to obtain the weight vector for one ranking 
from the weight vector for the previous ranking, you just apply matrix P. 
Thus any one of weight vectors is given by the appropriate power of P 
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acting on vector W as P( . . . (P(W) . . . ). So, if W = (w(l), . . . , w(n)), then 
the other weight vectors are (w(2), . . . , w(n), w(1)); (w(3), . . . , w(l), 
w(2));. . . ; (w(n), w(l), . . . , w(n - 1)). 
Our goal is to show that in certain situations the n weight vectors for a 
Condorcet n-tuple are linearly independent. This would give us a j = 1 
version of Lemma 1 where a constraint is imposed upon the possible voters’ 
rankings. Although the approach we use may appear different from that of 
the proof of Lemma 1, it has similarities in that it depends upon the 
eigenvalues and eigenvectors of P( i, j). 
LEMMA 2. k’t w = (W(l), . . . , w(n)) be a weight vector for n > 1 alterna- 
tives. Let p( W, z) be the polynomial 
p(W,z) = w(l) + w(2)z + w(3)z2 + *.* +w(n)z(“-‘) (5.1) 
assume that p( W, r) does not equal zero for any r which is an nth root of unity. 
Then the Condorcet n-tuple generated by vector W is linearly independent. 
Proof of Lemma 2. Let W(i) be the ith vector in the Condorcet n-tuple 
generated by vector W. With this notation, W(1) = W. The vector sum 
Cd(k)W(i) = 0, where k = (n + 1 - i)modn + 1, is equivalent to the 
matrix equation (D)C( W) = 0. Here matrix C(W) is the circulant matrix 
(see, for example, Davis [1]), where the ith row is given by vector W(k) (k 
is determined as given in the previous line) and row vector D is given by 
(d(l), . . . , d(n)). Vector D must be the zero vector if and only if the 
determinant of matrix C(W) is zero which is true if and only if any of the 
eigenvalues of this symmetric matrix are equal to zero. One of the eigenval- 
ues of this matrix is unity with corresponding eigenvector e, while the other 
eigenvalues are given by p( W, r), where r is one of the n th roots of unity. 
By hypothesis, all of the eigenvalues are non-zero, so the vectors in the 
Condorcet n-tuple are linearly independent. This completes the proof of the 
lemma (See [l].) 
There are weight vectors which do not satisfy these conditions, such as 
W = (1, 1, 0,O). For this vector, p( W, - 1) = 0, and it is trivial to show that 
the corresponding Condor& 4-tuple is not linearly independent. On the 
other hand, from this system sets of three weight vectors can be found 
which are linearly independent. It is easy to show that if n = 3, then all 
weight vectors satisfy these conditions. 
In reference [3], we showed that there always is a Condorcet (n + 1) tuple 
contained within the lift of a Condorcet n-tuple. We use this in the 
statement of the next theorem, which asserts that even should we impose a 
restriction that the voters’ preferences can only lie in n of the n! possible 
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ranking classes, if enough symmetry is admitted, then the conclusions of 
Theorem 2 still hold. 
THEOREM 6. Assume there are n > 1 alternatives, and assume the condi- 
tions of Theorem 2 with the additional restriction on the weight vectors that if r 
is a jth root of unity, then it is not a zero of the (j - 1)th degree polynomial 
p( W( j), z). Then there exist examples of voters with the property that when j 
alternatives are being considered, each voter’s preferences are one of the j 
possible rankings of some particular Condorcet j-tuple and still the conclusions 
of Theorem 2 hold. If in addition, the weights are all rational numbers, then 
the corresponding conclusion of Theorem 4 apply. 
In the proof of this theorem, Lemma 2 is substituted for that of Lemma 1. 
It follows from the cyclic behavior of these vectors in a Condorcet n-tuple 
that their sum is n(e), so the second technical condition is also satisfied. 
(This is because in the vector sum each weight appears once and only once 
in each coordinate position.) 
A similar restriction on voters’ preferences will not yield the conclusion of 
Theorems 1 and 3. By comparing a dimension count on the domain and the 
range, it is clear that mapping f cannot be sujective. Notice that by 
admitting additional voters’ preferences, the rank of this mapping can 
increase. The full strength of Theorems 1 and 3 do not apply until this rank 
has dimension j(n - 1). On the other hand, once the rank has exceeded 
(n - 1) some “paradoxes” are admitted. We have not attempted to classify 
these paradoxes in terms of admitted preference classes. 
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